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Abstract 
It is usually preached by economists that trade should be free, but in reality, it is almost 
always chained. The reason for this discrepancy lies in the fact that trade policies are set in 
political contexts in which policy makers have different objective function than maximizing 
economic efficiency. So, endogenous protection literature evolved around the ideas and reasons 
to explain trade policy as determined under specific political contexts. The early empirical work 
until late 1980s examined the correlation between different political factors and trade policies. 
These works were helpful in identifying relative importance of political economy variables, but 
were criticized to have specifications which were loosely linked with the theories behind them.  
In recent years with development of theoretical platforms, study of political economy of 
trade policy has moved to a more structured direction and empirical investigations have been 
done to link real world data with the model predictions. In this regard, Median Voter model and 
Grossman-Helpman (GH) model are the main branches of literature. Median Voter model 
predicts positive tariffs in capital-abundant countries and negative tariffs in labor-abundant ones, 
but in real world, negative tariffs are rare. Empirical investigation of this model tries to reconcile 
observed trade policies with median voter model and two of these studies are included in this 
report. Interest group model is the framework of Grossman-Helpman model in which the effect 
of organized lobbies in trade policy determination is taken into account. Two empirical studies of 
this model showed that real world data support this model. By employing modifications in GH 
model, researchers try to account for factors like lobbying competition and foreign lobbying in 
explaining data. These results show that foreign lobbying is not necessarily against trade and 
ignoring lobbying competition may lead to wrong conclusions about welfare mindedness of 
government.  
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Chapter 1- Introduction 
There is a general agreement among economists for free trade, but free trade is almost 
never seen. What we practically see in lots of governments are protectionist policies. Theoretical 
and empirical studies on the “political economy of trade policy” tend to shed light on the trends 
and policies seen in trade and explain why we do not see free trade. One of the main 
explanations is that trade policies are made not to maximize economic efficiency, but they are set 
in political contexts in which the objectives of policy makers are different.  
The main objective of this report is to summarize theories and empirical studies on 
protection for sale. In this review of “endogenous” trade policy determination, I try to include the 
core of literature on the political economy of trade policy. Chapters in this study are organized as 
follows:  
In chapter 2, first generation of theoretical and empirical studies for trade policy is 
reviewed. In this regard, results of studies on Canada’s tariff structure (Caves 1976) and trade 
liberalization in U.S. import policy (Trefler 1993) are presented and evaluated against proposed 
models. In chapter 3, theoretical studies of the Median Voter model in shaping trade policies are 
reviewed. Empirical evidence to reconcile median voter model predictions with real world 
protectionism is also included. In chapter 4, the other branch of theoretical approaches in trade 
policy, the interest group theory, is reviewed. In this case, the "protection for sale" model 
developed by Grossman and Helpman (1994) (GH) is explained and the first two studies of 
empirical investigations of this model is reviewed. This chapter also includes studies of the 
extensions of the GH model in which the effect of lobbying competition and foreign lobbying is 
taken into account.   
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Chapter 2- First generation of empirical investigation of trade policy 
The political economy of trade corresponds to the study of trade policy determination 
under different political economy contexts. The initial work in this area was mostly empirical 
until late 1980s in which economic and political factors in trade policy determination were 
examined. In this regard, several models were used to shed light on the reasons on receiving 
trade protection and how it is different in various industries. These models include pressure 
group or interest group model, adding machine model, status Quo model, social change model 
and foreign policy model. Each of these models are explained briefly first and the empirical 
works in support or deny of each is followed next. ( Gawande and Krishna,2002) 
2-1-First generation of theoretical models for trade policy 
 
1) In pressure group or interest group model, politicians are influenced by lobbies in order to 
make policies which would benefit them more. It suggests that protection level in an industry 
and their ability to resist trade liberalization is linked to number of firms in that industry and 
the degree of geographic and seller concentration. Also, it suggests that industry protection is 
negatively related to industry growth rates and positively related to increase in import 
penetration ratios. (Olson 1965,Stigler 1971,Peltzman 1976,Pincus 1975) 
2) In Adding machine model, the extent of trade protection in an industry is related to the voting 
strength of that industry and the amount of protection in an industry is positively related to 
the number of employees in it.(Caves 1976) 
3) In Status Quo model, it is suggested that there is a conservative respect for the status quo by 
government officials and their wish to avoid huge adjustment costs. This model assumes that 
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present protection depends on past levels of protection and changes in tariff levels and 
changes in import penetration are positively related. Also, tariff levels are positively related 
to variables which show the ability of workers to adjust to tariff changes. (Corden 
1974,Lavergne 1983) 
4) In social change model, government is believed to have motivations based on social justice to 
move towards income equality in society, so it suggests high protection levels and low tariff 
cuts in sectors with low income and unskilled workers.(Ball 1967,Constantopoulos 1974) 
5) In foreign policy model, trade policy depends on bargaining ability and countries’ 
possibilities for trade negotiations. As an example, a country would rather to lower its trade 
barriers against another country in which it has investments, so that the ability of the country 
to limit the flow of earnings to investment country enhances the foreign country bargaining 
ability. (Krishna and Gawande 2001) 
Using these models in first generation of empirical literature, the relevance of the variables 
suggested by the mentioned models such as industry size, employment, concentration ratio and 
level of imports were investigated using simple quantitative techniques and regression analysis 
by different researchers. (Krishna and Gawande 2002). In the next section, empirical studies of 
two authors, Caves (1976) and Trefler (1993) are reviewed.  
2-2- First Generation of empirical evidence 
2-2-1- Canada’s tariff structure, a model for political choice 
Caves (1976) studied patterns of tariff rates as of 1963 in support of Canada’s secondary 
manufacturing industries. Variables were used in a cross industry regression analysis. He has 
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discussed three competing models of adding machine, interest group and national policy. (Caves 
1976) 
The principle dependent variable in his study was the effective rate of protection (EFT). 
He also included another dependent variable as the average nominal rate of tariff protection, so 
that effective rates could be tested to see whether they can be explained more complete than 
nominal rates. Nontariff-barrier’s is a source of error in both dependent variables. Equations to 
be estimated and details of variables are included in table 2-1. In this study, variables 
abbreviations are as follows: (Caves 1976) 
VPW is the Value added per worker in the Canadian industry in 1963. The lower the 
value added per worker, the more workers are benefited by a tariff that insulates a given 
amount of value added from import competition .CR4 is the percentage of industry 
shipments accounted for by the largest 4 enterprises,1968. MSC is shipments by the 
Canadian industry in 1967, expressed in units of average shipments per plant in the 
corresponding U.S. industry, 1967. TRN is the weighted average of rail and truck shipping 
costs per dollar’s worth of product between Cleveland and Chicago. GEG is the percentage 
of employees located outside of Quebec and Ontario, 1963. BCR is the percentage of sales 
made by an industry to other industries that individually account for more than 5 per cent 
of its total sales to sectors other than itself, 1961. 
GRO is the value of industry shipments in 1967 divided by value of industry shipments in 
1958. NSP is one minus the industry's enterprise specialization ratio in 1968. NPC is the 
fraction of non-production workers in an industry's total labor force multiplied by the 
average compensation per non-production worker, United States industries, 1963. RPR is 
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the value added per employee in the United States industry divided by value added per 
employee in its Canadian counterpart, 1963, was taken directly from the volume; when 
observations had to be combined, employment in the Canadian industry was used as a 
weight. VRT is the value added in an industry divided by the value of its shipments in1967.  
Table 2-1- Determinants of effective and nominal rates of protection 
EQUATION 
NO 
Constant VPW CR4 TRN MSC BCR GRO NSP RPR NPC VRT GEG F 
1 52.7 0.011 
(0.669) 
-0.278 
(0.135) 
-0.581 
(0.306) 
-0.058 
(0.018) 
 
- - - - 
 
- - -0.239 
(0.197) 
4.46 
2 60.2 0.003 
(0.710) 
-0.265 
(0.147) 
-0.745 
(0.341) 
-0.064 
(0.019) 
0.015 
(0.077) 
-3.42 
(2.87) 
-0.135 
(0.247) 
- - - - 2.95 
3 29.8 -1.30 
(0.59) 
- - -0.042 
(0.016) 
- -2.73 
(3.15) 
- 0.117 
(0.084) 
2.64 
(3.27) 
8.73 
(24.1) 
-0.286 
(0.206) 
2.67 
         Note: Standard errors appear below the regression coefficients 
         Note: dependent variable is EFT for all equations. 
Based on statistical results for interest group, adding machine and national policy models, 
not all signs for F-ratios are correct and winner would not be picked simply. There is collinearity 
between VPW and CR4. CR4 coefficient is not influenced by omitting VPW, while VPW would 
be negative and significant upon omitting CR4. Caves (1976) empirical investigation showed 
great support for interest group and adding machine models from running equation 1 and 2 with 
CR4 omitted. However, sign of TRN and MSC variables support interest group model and GEG 
also weighs against adding machine model. For the National policy model, only one variable is 
significant and right-signed and MSC,GEG, RPR, NPC, and VRT are insignificant and correctly 
signed. So, judging on significant variables and right signs for each model, interest group model 
had the best results, while national policy model had low statistical significance and adding 
machine model suffers from wrong sign of significant coefficients. (Caves 1976) 
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2-2-2- Trade liberalization; U.S. import policy 
     Trefler in 1993, studied nontariff barriers (NTBs) in the United States and included the above 
mentioned analysis in his investigation. He estimated import and NTB equations simultaneously 
and investigated the theory of endogenous protection. (Brock and Magee 1978 ;Findlay and 
Wellisz 1982; Hillman 1982, 1989; Mayer 1984;Baldwin 1985;Magee, Brock and Young 1989) 
In NTB equation, regressors were measures of costs and benefits of lobbying and protection 
supply and he selected a factor endowment import equation in his study.  
      He then analyzed the relationship between import and protection by simultaneous estimation 
of NTB and import equation. In import equation, the dependent variable was import penetration 
which is gross import divided by domestic consumption. The extent of NTB protection is 
measured by NTB coverage ratio which is described as the fraction of commodities in an 
industry that is subject to any type of NTB. In this analysis, tariffs were neglected on the basis 
that low levels of US tariffs are continuously omitted by NTBs. Estimation of the structural 
model is done by simultaneous equations Tobit model as follows: (Trefler 1993) 
   
                      
                               
                                                                            
                                                                                 
                                                           (2-1) 
 
   
                                                   
                     
                                                  
                                  
                                                                                                                                
                             (2-2) 
   In these equations,   is an NTB coverage ratio (Bhagwati 1988), M is import penetration, 
     collects measures of the determinants of NTBs,     ollects measures of factor endowments, 
and (        is a bivariate normal residual vector. 
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Import penetration enters the NTB equation in three ways: (Trefler 1993) 
1- Import penetration enters linearly and directly 
2- Import penetration enters linearly but indirectly through                        since  
                       equal           , where   is import penetration in year t. 
3- Import penetration enters nonlinearly and indirectly since in the region (           
,N=0 rather than N=      +     This means that when import penetration is zero, NTBs 
are constrained to equal zero. The idea is that when import penetration is zero, protection 
has no value to domestic rent seekers, so that there is no lobbying for NTBs. 
    Results of Trefler study is summarized in table 2-2. It was seen that import penetration 
has a positive sign, but insignificant statistically and change in import penetration was large, 
showing increasing import penetration leads to greater penetration. On the other hand, export 
oriented industries do not get protection, as evident by the negative coefficient. Regarding 
business regressors, buyer and seller concentrations are important. Scale and capital stock 
variables show up as negative signs, showing that over controlling of entry of competitors, 
barriers for entry eliminate the need of protection. 
        From NTB analysis based on labor regressors, it was seen that the highest income 
careers get the highest protection, while the low income occupations get little protection. This 
result is against social change model and does not support that.  
Table 2-2: NTB Equation results 
Dependent 
Variable: NTBs 
 
Estimated 
Coefficient (1) 
t-Statistic (2) 
Beta 
Coefficient(3) 
Comparative 
Import penetration 0.17 0.46 0.11 
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advantage Δ(import 
penetration) 
3.31 2.58 
1.74 
Exports -1.82 -5.26 -0.94 
Business 
Seller 
concentration 
0.53 2.43 
0.42 
Seller number of 
firms 
-0.22 -1.86 
-0.33 
Buyer 
concentration 
-1.13 -2.08 
-0.33 
Buyer number of 
firms 
-0.06 -2.16 
-0.32 
Scale -1.83 -2.04 -0.46 
Capital stock -0.27 -2.02 -0.24 
labor 
Union 0.10 0.42 0.05 
Employment size 0.08 0.31 0.03 
Tenure -0.01 -0.33 -0.04 
Geographic 
concentration 
0.11 0.71 
0.07 
Broad -based 
Engineers, 
scientists 
1.63 1.70 
0.58 
White-collar 0.40 0.67 0.34 
Skilled -0.31 -0.61 -0.21 
Semiskilled 0.15 0.61 0.16 
Unskilled 0.90 1.57 0.53 
Unemployment 1.22 1.96 0.30 
Industry growth 0.03 0.26 0.03 
         
Comparative advantage factors were measured by the change in import penetration ratio 
and the exports to value added ratio. As it can be seen in table 2-3, the regressors with the 
biggest t-statistics and beta coefficients have the expected signs which are negative and are 
sources of the comparative advantage. These factors are physical capital, white-collar labor and 
skilled labor. He concluded that the more skilled occupations are bigger sources of comparative 
advantage with the exceptions of inventors and engineers and scientists, which were source of 
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comparative disadvantage and not included in source of comparative advantage. It was shown in 
Trefler study that comparative advantages factors matter a lot in determination of NTBs and they 
are at least five times as important as business interest factors as were reported by Harkness 
(1978) and Bowen and Sveikauskas (1989). 
Table 2-3: The import equation results 
Depen.t VA: 
Import 
penetration 
 Estimated 
coefficient 
T-
Statistic 
Beta 
Coefficient 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
 
NTBs    )  -0.51
 -11.56 -0.80  
Capital Physical 
capital 
-2.01 -4.44 -0.44 -0.52 
Inventories 1.71 1.69 0.17 -0.46 
Labor Engin,scien 0.54 0.98 0.07 -0.55 
White-collar -1.70 -4.90 -0.45 -0.50 
Skilled -1.27 -3.44 -0.34 -0.55 
Semiskilled -0.59 -2.01 -0.15 -0.52 
Unskilled 0.40 1.98 0.20 -0.54 
Land Cropland 0.26 0.61 0.11 -0.53 
pasture 0.85 1.77 0.15 -0.53 
Forest 1.19 0.15 0.01 -0.53 
subsoil Coal 1.62 0.39 0.02 -0.51 
Petroleum -0.16 -0.78 -0.05 -0.61 
Minerals 1.29 0.39 0.02 -0.50 
Constant - 0.81 15.89 0.00 - 
 
His theory predicted that the higher the degree of protection, the more valuable protection 
is to private interests and US import policy is shaped by American business rather than organized 
labor which supports interest group and adding machine models. (Trefler 1993) 
According to Trefler study, manufacturing NTBs reduced US imports around $50 billion 
which is 24% of US manufacturing imports. This estimate is much higher than those which are 
derived from single equation models. 
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2-3 Conclusion     
   In summary, the relevance of several determinants of trade policy was investigated in the 
first generation of trade policy. Empirical results in each case provided a measure of support or 
denial to the theories in various areas; some we showed were for tariffs in Canada and nontariff 
barriers. A summary of the strengths of models in explaining empirical results is shown in table 
2-4. The biggest problem with studies which try to compare different models and get the relative 
importance of each is the need to determine one-to-one the variables that represent each model. 
Most of the time, these variables are not sharply separated and are correlated which hinders 
detailed and precise determination of validity of models.   
        In order to overcome this shortcoming, we need more specified micro-foundation 
models, and this was done with evolution of more structural models which link empirical data to 
the models explaining them more tightly. These models are reviewed and presented in the 
following chapters. 
Table 2-4: Strength of each model in explaining empirical results 
 Interest 
group 
Adding 
Machine 
Status 
Quo 
Foreign 
Policy 
Social 
Change 
Trefler(1993) 
(NTBs) 
strong none none none none 
Caves(1976) 
(Canada Tariffs) 
Strong Low none none none 
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Chapter 3- Median Voter model for trade policy 
   In chapter 2, I have reviewed first generation of empirical approaches towards 
endogenous trade policy determination in which simple quantitative techniques and regression 
analysis were used to find evidence of support for specific models. Some theoretical frameworks 
have also been developed to explain trade policy determination and empirical data were used to 
evaluate the predictions of these models. In this chapter, I review theoretical studies of the role of 
democracy in shaping trade policy by majoritarian elections and provide some examples of 
where empirical data were examined against theoretical models. 
      There are two branches in theoretical studies on trade policy, one represent the direct 
democracy or median-voter approach, and the other represents the interest group theories. In the 
median voter approach, it is assumed that trade policy is being directly voted, or the government 
selects policies such as to reflect majority opinion on the issue. In interest group theories, it is 
assumed that trade policy is determined by the interaction among lobbies, which represent the 
economic interest of their members, and government (Krishna and Gawande 2001). Here, I 
explain median voter model and some empirical approaches to test this model.  
3-1-Median Voter Model 
      The median voter theorem, first shown by Black (1948), is the result of a classical model 
used to describe the positioning of candidates in majority-rule elections, stating that candidates 
will converge to the median. It was shown by Black (1948) that in a policy context which is uni-
dimensional and with a single peak in individual preferences over the policy, the median voter’s 
preferred policy choice dominates over any alternative.  
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     Mayer (1984) derived the implications of this result in the context of general equilibrium 
models of trade. In the two sector two factor Heckscher-ohlin version of Mayer’s model (MHO), 
it is predicted that equilibrium trade policies are biased against trade in capital rich countries and 
for trade in capital poor countries. Since more trade leads to a high factor reward for the 
abundant factor and a low factor reward for the scarce factor, we would see import barriers and 
import subsidies in capital-rich and capital-poor countries, respectively. Median voter theorem 
has the prediction of positive tariffs in capital abundant countries and negative tariffs in labor 
abundant countries. In real world, however, trade policies are almost always against trade which 
is in contrast with median voter predictions. It should be noted that other factors of pressure on 
government through lobbies and interest groups affect the real world trade policies. (Dutt and 
Mitra 2002) 
3-2- Empirical Evidence of median voter model 
3-2-1-: Endogenous trade policy, median voter approach 
 
Researchers have tried to reconcile the median voter theory results with observed 
protectionism across countries. Dutt and Mitra (2002) used the median voter approach to trade 
policy determination and investigated another prediction which is about cross-country variations 
in trade barrier levels and not the absolute tariffs. They used the Mayer-Heckscher-Ohlin 
framework to predict variations in trade policy across countries, using cross-sectional data on 
inequality, capital abundance and measures of trade restrictions and openness. Keeping other 
factors in trade policy determination constant with respect to inequality, total import tariff would 
rise or fall with inequality, so that the positive or negative Mayer component becomes more 
positive or negative. (Dutt and Mitra 2002) 
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     Two measures of inequality, Gini-coefficient, as a summary measure of inequality and 
the share of the median quintile of the population in national income as the share of median voter 
in Mayer framework, were used to investigate levels of trade restrictiveness. (Dutt and Mitra 
2002)  
      Dutt and Mitra (2002) used a two-factor two-sector, small-open, Heckscher-Ohlin 
economy. There are 2 goods, one importable and one exportable which both need capital and 
labor in their production. Individual preferences are identical and homothetic and indirect utility 
function for individual h is V(p)I
h
. An individual income can be written as: 
                                                                                             (3-1) 
In which σh is the share of individual h of the overall capital stock of economy, p is the domestic 
price of the importable good and p* is its world price, K is the aggregate capital stock of the 
economy, φh is the individual share in the total tariff revenue, M(p) is the import of good 1, w(p) 
and r(p) are the wage rate earned by labor and rental earned on capital, respectively.  
Maximizing V(p)I
h
(p) with respect to p gives the most preferred tariff of individual h as: 
    
  
       
 
      
  
                                                                                              (3-2) 
     In this equation, I is the aggregate income. If we assume that the voters differ only along 
a single dimension and along their capital-labor endowment K
h
, median voter theorem can be 
used to get the tariff under the majority voting. This tariff is the one which maximizes the utility 
of the individual with the median relative capital-labor endowment in the economy. The 
objective function is then maximizing V(p)I
mv
 or v(p) + i
mv
 in which v(p)=Ln V(p) and I
mv
=Ln 
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I
mv
. This objective function is assumed to be concave with respect to price. The first order 
condition is: 
      
    
  
                                                                                                         (3-3) 
In which i
mv
 can be expanded as 
                                 
 
 
                                                                  (3-4) 
 Where   is the ratio of total tariff revenue to national factor income. σmv is the share of median 
voter in the capital stock which is always less than the real world amount (Alesina and Rodrik 
1994). σmv is an inverse index of inequality and was used to study the effect of a change in  
inequality on trade policy. Having t
mv 
as the most preferred level of tariff for the median voter, 
differentiating the first order condition would result in: 
    
    
  
                       
                          
     
   
 
                                                                                     (3-5) 
For a capital-rich country, r´(p) <0 and w´(p) >0 and the opposite is true for a labor-rich country. 
     Because of having a restriction of concavity which is applied on objective function, the 
denominator of equation 3-5 is always negative, so that the derivative is negative for capital-rich 
countries and increasing inequality results in an increase in the equilibrium tariff. On the other 
hand, the derivative is positive for a labor-rich country and increasing inequality leads to an 
increased demand for redistribution which would benefit labor at the expense of capital.  
     Based on the previous discussion, in a country with high value of K/L ratio, inequality 
and trade restrictiveness are positively related and an inverse relationship exists for a country 
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with low K/L ratio. Using the following relationship, the turning point of K/L would be 
determined empirically: 
T                       
 
 
      
 
 
                                                        (3-6) 
In which TRi is trade restrictions in country i,       is the level of inequality,  
 
 
   the 
capital labor ratio and    is a row vector of control variables, and the first derivative is as 
follows: 
    
        
       
 
 
                                                                                                                (3-7) 
     The prediction of this equation is   <0 and   >0 and   +   (K/L)i≥0 as (K/L)i≥(K/L)* in 
which (K/L)*=-   /   is the turning point of capital to labor ratio. Also, (K/L)* should be within 
the range of K/L values in the dataset for the prediction to hold true.  
       Tables 3-1 and 3-2 show the regression results for the equation 3-6. Trade protection is 
the dependent variable and independent variables are inequality, the capital-labor ratio, 
democracy and political rights indicators and schooling. Multiple trade policy measures such as 
IMPORT DUTY as total import duties collected as a percentage of total imports, TARIFF as an 
average tariff rate , QUOTA as a coverage ratio for non tariff barriers to trade and (X+M)/GDP  
as an indirect measure of trade restrictions were used to test the robustness of the results. (Dutt 
and Mitra 2002) 
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Table 3-1: Gini Coefficient Regression with and without controls 
 Tariff Quota Import duty (X+M)/GDP Tariff Quota Import duty (X+M)/GDP 
Gini 
Gini*capital-labor ratio 
Capital-labor ratio 
schooling 
Political rights(Gastil) 
Sub-saharan Africa 
East Asia 
Oil 
Constant 
No.of observation 
R2 
F-statistic 
Critical capital-labor 
ratio 
-0.029  (0.016) 
0.003 (0.001) 
-0.189 (0.068) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1.942 (0.71) 
51 
0.36 
8.82 
9.7 
0.012 (0.022) 
-0.0002 (0.002) 
-0.037 (0.093) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.157 (0.96) 
50 
0.25 
5.23 
55 
-1.048 (0.679) 
0.144 (0.067) 
-8.406 (2.888) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
78.218 (29.54) 
56 
0.44 
11.97 
7.3 
0.049 (0.04) 
-0.006 (0.004) 
0.341 (0.166) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-2.372 (1.722) 
45 
0.22 
5.03 
8.2 
-0.051 (0.023) 
0.006 (0.002) 
-0.328 (0.11) 
0.006 (0.019) 
-0.025 (0.021) 
-0.068 (0.095) 
-0.103 (0.088) 
0.017 (0.081) 
3.291 (1.005) 
45 
0.47 
4.01 
8.5 
0.016 (0.03) 
-0.001 (0.003) 
-0.03 (0.151) 
-0.03 (0.029) 
-0.02 (0.028) 
-0.259 (0.126) 
-0.202 (0.119) 
-0.107 (0.108) 
0.414 (1.356) 
45 
0.42 
3.29 
16 
-2.141 (0.794) 
0.249 (0.083) 
-13.85 (3.986) 
0.593 (0.705) 
0.397 (0.776) 
1.537 (3.341) 
-6.981 (3.189) 
1.085 (3.052) 
129.835 (35.93) 
44 
0.6 
6.79 
8.6 
0.082 (0.05) 
-0.01 (0.005) 
0.58 (0.247) 
-0.042 (0.042) 
0.037 (0.047) 
0.022 (21.7) 
0.591 (0.203) 
-0.141 (0.187) 
-4.365 (2.273) 
49 
0.37 
3.0 
8.2 
 
Table 3-2: Third Quintile Regression with and without controls 
 Tariff Quota Import duty (X+M)/GDP Tariff Quota Import duty (X+M)/GDP 
Q3 
Q3*capital-labor ratio 
Capital-labor ratio 
Schooling 
Political rights(gastil) 
Sub-saharan Africa 
East Asia 
Oil 
Constant 
No. of observations 
R2 
F-statistic 
Critical capital-labor 
ratio 
0.136 (0.042) 
-0.015 (0.004) 
0.18 (0.057) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-0.431 (0.58) 
56 
0.32 
8.0 
9.1 
0.081 (0.06) 
-0.012 (0.006) 
0.158 (0.082) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-0.863 (0.827) 
56 
0.15 
2.95 
6.8 
6.752 (1.821) 
-0.747 (0.183) 
8.803 (2.215) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-66.206 (24.942) 
58 
0.39 
11.66 
9.0 
-0.196 (0.062) 
0.025 (0.062) 
-0.324 (0.086) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
2.687 (0.855) 
64 
0.41 
13.86 
7.8 
0.121 (0.055) 
-0.013 (0.006) 
0.15 (0.078) 
-0.025 (0.018) 
-0.015 (0.018) 
-0.081 (0.083) 
-0.051 (0.097) 
-0.089 (0.097) 
-0.995 (0.798) 
49 
0.41 
3.41 
9.3 
0.021 (0.075) 
-0.005 (0.008) 
0.07 (0.106) 
-0.054 (0.025) 
-0.045 (0.025) 
-0.162 (0.112) 
-0.052 (0.133) 
-0.223 (0.133) 
0.435 (1.081) 
50 
0.32 
2.36 
4.2 
5.15 (1.879) 
-0.558 (0.2) 
6.508 (2.647) 
-1.073 (0.602) 
-0.602 (0.653) 
1.003 (2.673) 
-2.717 (3.436) 
-2.142 (3.813) 
-40.459 (26.87) 
51 
0.55 
6.32 
9.2 
-0.09 (0.068) 
0.012 (0.007) 
-0.154 (0.096) 
0.041 (0.021) 
-0.001 (0.023) 
0.023 (0.097) 
-0.002 (0.124) 
0.017 (0.125) 
1.207 (0.979) 
56 
0.47 
5.2 
7.5 
       
These results with and without controls strongly support median voter model predictions. When 
using Gini coefficient, α1<0 and α2>0 as predicted and reverse is true when Q3 (third quintile) 
was used. The turning point of capital-labor ratio is also indicated in results and except for quota 
regressions, the values are close to median and mean capital-labor ratio. They showed 
empirically that increasing inequality increases import protection in capital rich countries and 
reduces trade barriers in capital scarce countries which is consistent with two factor two sector 
Heckscher-Ohlin model in median voter approach. (Dutt and Mitra 2002) 
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3-2-2- Observed Tariffs and Median Voter Model  
In another study, Dhingra (2010) showed that the optimal tariff in large countries is a sum 
of median voter term and a positive term of trade component. By assuming large countries, the 
world price of a good is affected by changes in the domestic tariff rate. She followed MHO 
framework with two goods and two factors in the economy. It was assumed that production 
functions are homogeneous of degree one and each agent can earn income equal to       and 
national factor rewards is:   
   
     
     
                                                                                           (3-8) 
In this equation, (w) is wage rate a unit of labor earns, and a unit of capital earns a rental rate (r). 
If country impose tariff rate on good 1 so the total income yi will be:  
                                                                                                       (3-9) 
Each individual would like to maximize his utility by  
                                                                                                       (3-10) 
Where    is indirect utility function, p is domestic price of good 1 in term of good 2 equal: 
        . 
    is tariff level and    is total income.   is world price (Dhingra 2010)   
 Choosing a tariff rate of
   
  
  , using Roy’s identity to show the optimal tariff and 
differentiating national income, we get 
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                          (3-11)  
These are the three important elements in determining individual tariff rate. When change 
in tariff weighted imports is negative for all individuals, depending on individual i’s ownership 
of capital, the income share may rise or fall. For all individuals, the terms of trade effect is the 
same and is positive in a large country. (Dhingra 2010)   
 The distinction of Dhingra approach compared to standard MHO model is that he 
considered a large country which has an effect on world prices. Imposing a tariff by a large 
country leads to decrease in price for its imported goods which means terms of trade effect are 
positive. In standard MHO model, a small open economy is assumed and consequently, its tariff 
would not affect world prices.   
    When individual trade policy preferences are single peaked, according to the median 
voter theorem, the adopted tariff is the median voter’s optimal tariff as follows: (Dhingra 2010) 
          
 
   
  
  
 
  
    
  
   
    
   
   
  
                                                                               (3-12) 
In which the first term is the Mayer median voter component and the second one is a 
terms of trade component (TOT). TOT part is the inverse of the export supply elasticity of home 
country’s imports of good 1, so trade policy can be written as: 
     
 
   
  
  
 
   
    
  
   
   
 
  
                                                                                                           (3-13) 
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      The sign of median voter term is determined by the change of median voter’s income 
share by a domestic tariff, dφmv/dt. For a small country, the second term is zero since small 
countries have a perfect elastic export supply and hence, tariffs are positive in capital abundant 
countries and negative in labor abundant ones. In a large capital-abundant country, tariff is 
positive due to positive median voter and terms of trade components. However, in a large labor-
abundant country, tariffs may become positive due to terms of trade considerations which are 
opposite to the case of small countries. He then used an empirical model to test the large country 
level of tariff prediction.  
He described the optimal tariff by equation: 
     
 
   
  
  
 
   
    
  
   
   
 
  
 =    MV+TOT                                                                       (3-14) 
In which      
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
             is the median voter coefficient. Sign of this coefficient 
depends on factor-abundance. 
     She stated that level of tariff prediction would imply that majority considerations have a 
negative effect on labor abundant countries and a positive effect in capital rich countries. If 
          , and K* shows the threshold capital-labor ratio which separates countries to labor 
and capital abundant, then       for all countries with     
  and       for all countries 
with     
 . 
Also, the large country level prediction leads to the prediction of a positive influence of 
terms of trade in all large countries. The linear regression she used is as follows:  
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          +       .                                                                                                  (3-15)      
In which Z is vector of controls and   is an error term.  
  In order to construct TOT measures, she used either import elasticity data or import 
shares and tested the signs of key variables with the ones predicted by large country MHO 
model. These results are summarized in table 3-3. (Dhingra 2010) 
Table 3-3: large country level prediction test 
Variable description Variable Coef. Expected sign 
Majority’s relative earning MV    ( - ) 
Majority’s relative earning 
(K/L) 
MV.k    ( + ) 
Terms of trade TOT      ( + ) 
 
A result of estimating equation 3-15 is shown in table 3-4. In this table, column (a) corresponds 
to results for small country (without TOT) and columns (b) and (c) correspond to results of level 
prediction for large countries.  
Table 3-4: Absolute and relative levels: Trade Restrictiveness Indices (TRIs) 
Level of TRI 
 (a) OLS (b) OLS (c) IV 
MV -15.619 (3.521) -16.758 (3.698) -17.239 (3.513) 
MV.k 10.061 (2.264) 10.950 (2.386) 11.326 (2.254) 
ToT(elasticity) - 0.322
  
(0.201)
 
0.458 (0.219)
 
K -0.288 (0.077) -0.314 (0.083) -0.324 (0.079) 
intercept 0.635 (0.141) -2.863 (2.192) -4.340 (2.396) 
 
1.55 1.53 1.522 
N 35 35 35 
 
0.283 0.335 0.326 
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       According to table 3-4, the median voter variable and the interaction term are 
statistically significant and have the expected signs for both small and large countries. It shows 
that in all countries with human capital lower than k
*, 
the median voter component is negative, 
while it is positive in all countries with human capital higher than k
*
. It is seen in columns a and 
b that k
* 
is similar in large and small countries. 
       In large countries, terms of trade is also included in level of tariff and it is positive and 
significant (column b). Test of endogeneity bias was also done to check for any endogeneity bias 
due to the influence of trade policy on median voter term or terms of trade variables. When only 
TOT is assumed to be endogenous, instrumental variable (IV) estimates are similar to OLS 
results in large country level prediction (column c). 
     The baseline results show that TOT coefficients are not estimated precisely which can be 
due to World Trade Organization (WTO) membership. This parameter should be accounted for 
to get precise results which were done by adding an interaction term for WTO members and 
TOT.  Then, TOT coefficients were found to be positive and statistically significant which is 
seen in columns a and b of table 3-5. TOT component of tariff is lower for WTO members since 
members of WTO may get tariff adjustments for reasons other than terms of trade externalities. 
(Dhingra 2010) 
Table 3-5: level test: Trade Restrictiveness Indices (TRIs) 
 Without controls OLS 
(a) 
With controls  
OLS (b) 
MV -16.758 (3.698) -19.078 (3.721) 
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MV.HKI 10.950  (2.386) 13.063 (2.426) 
ToT (Elasticity) 3.322 (0.201) 5.458 (0.915) 
Member. ToT - -5.092 (0.940) 
Member - 55.578 (10.285) 
N 35 35 
 
3-3- Conclusion 
      To conclude, Dhingra (2010) has examined median voter model in a large country to see 
role of majority concerns and terms of trade in tariff setting across countries. It was shown that 
tariff in a large country is a sum of median voter and TOT components which the latter is 
positive and has a positive impact on tariff across all large countries. Terms of trade component, 
on the other hand, has a negative impact on tariffs in labor abundant and positive impact in 
capital abundant countries which is in line with median voter model.  
      In this chapter, theoretical framework for trade policy determination was explained, with 
an emphasis on median voter model. I have provided two examples of literature where median 
voter theory was tested for empirical data across countries. Other factors like TOT had to be 
added to model in Dhingra work to account for the observed data. 
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Chapter 4- Interest group model for trade policy 
In previous chapter, the median voter model in determining trade policy outcomes was 
reviewed, along with empirical investigation of its predictions in a couple of studies. In this 
chapter, the other branch of theoretical approaches in trade policy, the interest group theory, is 
reviewed. In this case, the "protection for sale" model developed by Grossman and Helpman 
(1994) (GH) has become the most prominent representative of this part of the literature. Given its 
importance, in the first part, I explain GH model along with its predictions, and in second part, 
the first two studies of empirical investigations of this model is reviewed. In the last part of this 
chapter, I review an extension of GH model in which lobbying competition and foreign lobbying 
is also taken into account. 
4-1- Grossman-Helpman model 
In Grossman and Helpman (GH) model (1994), a small economy with n specific factors 
is modeled. This is a model with a relatively simple structure that yields clear-cut empirical 
predictions and has been applied in a number of subsequent theoretical analyses (maggi and 
Goldberg 1999) This model has implications for the cross-sectional structure of trade protection 
and predicts that the cross-sectional differences in protection should be explained by three 
variables of import elasticity including, import penetration ratio and whether industry is 
organized politically. 
GH (1994) considers a small open economy with a numeraire good and "n" non-
numeraire goods. The numeraire good is produced one to one from labor, while each non-
numeraire good is produced from labor and sector specific input. Returns to specific factor i 
depends on pi and is shown by πi(pi)   d by Hote  i g’s  e     π’i(pi) = yi(pi) in which yi(pi) 
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is the supply function for good i. In GH model, a linear government objective function is 
assumed which derives expressions for cross sectional patterns of tariffs that could be tested 
directly. (Krishna and Gawande 2001) 
The demand side of the model is represented by consumers with the same additive and 
quasilinear preference structure as represented by expression: analyses (Maggi and Goldberg 
1999) 
        
 
                                                                                       (4-1) 
In which    is consumption of the numeraire good (good 0),    is consumption of goods 
i=1…..n. and    is an increasing concave function. This implies that the demand for each non-
numeraire good is not affected by income or substitution effects. The assumptions on the supply 
and demand sides of the model imply that GH(1994) represent an economy with a collection of 
partial equilibrium sectors where the price of each non-numeraire good is not affected by price of 
other goods.  
In GH (1994) model in which individuals have the quasi linear preferences as in equation 
4-1, some sectors are organized politically which influence politicians through campaign 
contributions. Politicians maximize a linear objective function with political contributions by 
lobbies and aggregate social welfare as its components. Politicians and lobbies interact in a form 
of menu auction.  In this system, each organized lobby provides a contribution schedule to the 
government in which they state the promised contribution level for any possible domestic price 
vector implemented by the government. In the first stage, each lobby present its contribution 
schedule, assuming other lobbies contribution schedules as given, and in the second stage, 
government decides tariffs in an optimization process, taking all lobbies contribution schedules 
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as given. Prediction across sectors is measured as a vector of export and import subsidies and 
taxes on the n goods. GH predicts the cross-industry pattern of protection as follows :( Krishna 
and Gawande 2001) 
  
    
 
     
    
 
  
  
                   (4-2) 
In equation (4-2),    is the domestic price of good i and p is the world price,     
    
 
  
is the ad valorem tariff or subsidy on good i in equilibirum.     equals one indicates sector i is 
organazid into a lobby and it is zero otherwise. the parameter    is the fraction of the population 
organized into lobbies,    is the equilibirum ratio of domestic output to imports and    is the 
elasticity of import demand (positive) or export supply(negative). 
The effect of organized interest in securing trade protection can be seen in this model. If 
an industry is import-competing producer and is organized (Ii>0), it is able to buy protection and 
gets a protective import tax, but if it is not organized (Ii<0), it gets an import subsidy. Also, if the 
industry is an exporter and it is organized, it would be able to buy an export subsidy, but if it is 
not organized, its exports are taxed.  The extent of protection which an industry receives is 
determined by the industry’s stakes from protection. It can also be observed that protection 
depends inversely on elasticity of import demand and the extent of competition among lobbies 
manifests itself in tariff expression. The mathematic expression of equation 4-3 can be written in 
an empirically testable form as: (Krishna and Gawande, 2001) 
  
    
   
  
    
 
  
  
  
 
    
   
  
  
                              i=1,…..,n                                         (4-3) 
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Based on this equation, it is predicted that the coefficient on zi/ei is negative, the 
coefficient on is   
  
  
 positive, and sum of coefficient must be positive, since      . Also, 
using  zi/ei and Ii zi/ei coefficinets, the size of “a” which is the weight that government places on 
aggregate welfare compared to the weight on aggregate political contributions can be adressed 
quantitavely.  
4-2- Empirical investigation of GH model;U.S. nontariff bariers 
Predictions of this model were tested by Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and 
Bandyopadhyay (2000). Goldberg and Maggi used data on nontariff barriers for the United 
States in 1983. For government and lobbies interaction, they assumed a Nash bargaining game 
mechanism which is a simpler mechanism than menu auction and leads to the same trade policy 
result. In Nash bargaining solution, trade policies are selected to maximize the joint surplus of all 
parties involved and the joint surplus is given by equation (Goldberg and Maggie 1999) 
              
 
                                              (4-4) 
Where   is joint surplus,   is the weight of welfare In the government‘s objective.   is 
aggregate well-being lobby’s j. 
Using this equation to find equilibrium trade policies, one gets the following equation: 
  
    
 
     
 
   
   
  
  
  
                                                  (4-5) 
Where    is the ad valorem tariff on good i,    is the import-demand elasticity of good i. 
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This equation is used as the basis of their empirical specifications with adding an error 
term that can be thought of as a composite of other variables affecting protection. After adding 
the error term, the estimating equation is as equation: 
  
    
    
     
 
   
   
 
  
  
     
  
  
  
  
  
                                                (4-6) 
Where γ    
  
 
   
     , and    
 
 
   
      
The full econometric model to estimate is as follows: 
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                                             (4-9) 
  
    
                                                   (4-10) 
    
                 
    
               
                  
                           (4-11) 
Where   
  is a latent variable that can be thought as the ‘’True’’ level of protection. This is 
equal to a multiple (    of the coverge ratio, represented by    
   
 
 , if the coverage ratio is 
strictly between zero and one. Similarly   
  is a latent variable and if this variable is positive, the 
sector is organized and the other organization dummy takes the value 1, otherwise the dummy is 
zero. The vectors     and      consist of variables employed in the specification for the inverse 
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import penetration ratio and the political organization dummy respectively.   ,    ,    are error 
terms.  
Signs of the coefficients γ and δ are examined to see if they match with the signs 
predicted with model. Also, structural parameters β and αL are derived to various values of μ to 
check if they fall into 0 to 1 range or not. In addition, more variables are introduced in the 
estimation to see if they can provide a better fit. These variables include sectoral employment 
size and unemployment rate, unionization measures, changes in import penetration, market 
concentration indices.  
Table 4-1 shows the results of estimating the trade protection equation. According to this 
table, for all cases of μ, the signs for coefficients γ and δ are consistent with GH model 
predictions. The sign prediction of δ+γ >0 does not find strong support. The model prediction 
that the relationship between protection and import penetration depends on politically organized 
or non organized sector is also supported by these results. Sign and statistical significance of δ 
shows that there is a different pattern in protection in organized and non-organized sectors. In 
non-organized sectors, the prediction of positive relationship between import penetration and 
protection is positive is also supported. However, the negative relationship of mentioned factors 
in organized sectors gets only weak support.  
Table 4-1: results from the basic specification (GH model) 
Variable             
  
  
 
-0.0093 (0.0040) -0.0133 (0.0059) -0.0155 (0.0070) 
  
  
 Ii 0.0106 (0.0053) 0.0155 (0.0077) 0.0186 (0.0093) 
Implied   0.986 (0.005) 0.984 (0.007) 0.981 (0.009) 
Implied  L 0.883 (0.223) 0.858 (0.217) 0.840 (0.214) 
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Structural parameters β and αL were retrieved, using γ and δ. It is seen that the higher μ, 
the higher the equivalent tariff and a lower weight on welfare and lower degree of lobby 
representation. The estimates of β and αL are within 0-1 range which is within the permissible 
range. They also tested for the variables which should not influence protection, according to the 
GH model. So, empirical specification was extended to include these variables and results of this 
exercise are shown in table 4-2. (Goldberg and Maggie 1999) 
Table 4-2: Alternative Specifications (     
Variable Specification 1 
Log-likelihood: -134.9 
Specification 2 
Log-likelihood:-132.06 
Specification 3 
Log-likelihood:-132.04 
Specification 4 
Log-likelihood:-130.61 
  
  
 
- -0.0093 (0.0040) -0.0096 (0.0043) -0.0109 (0.0045) 
  
  
 Ii - 0.0106 (0.0053) 0.0105 (0.0053) 0.0123 (0.0055) 
constant -0.0640 (0.1104) - -0.0287 (0.1375) -0.2619 (0.2559) 
Unemployment - - - 1.5722 (1.5884) 
Employment size - - - 1.1836 (0.8235) 
 
In column 1, results from specification in which γ and δ were left out and only one 
constant was included are reported. In column 2, the results from GH model are shown to 
provide a standard for comparison. Results of a specification in which two variables of model 
and one constant are included can be seen in column 3. Comparing column 1 and 3 gives us an 
idea of the fit of GH model. It is concluded that two variables of model improve fit of model. 
When other regressors were added in various specifications, no significant improvement of 
model fit was observed.  
Likelihood function was improved by a nonnegligible amount only in specification in 
column 4, in which sectoral unemployment and employment size were included in the 
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specification. So, there is some evidence that factor relating to unemployment can affect 
protection which is different than channels suggested by GH model. All in all in Goldberg and 
Maggi (1999) study, strict version of GH model was seen to be the model which can predict 
trade protection accurately with just simple enough, theoretically sound specification. The fact 
that model prediction was consistent with data and helps to explain the cross sectoral structure of 
trade protection was remarkable, compared with disastrous results of empirical performance of 
strict version of trade models, such as Heckscher- Ohlin model. 
4-3- Empirical investigation of an extension of GH model; U.S. nontariff 
bariers 
In strict GH model, the central role is given to inverse import penetration ratio, import 
elasticity and the level of protection. However, empirical literature on endogenous protection 
which we reviewed in previous chapter showed that other factors including market structure, 
firm concentration, average earnings, labor intensity, industry voting strength, skill composition 
of employees are the effective factors. Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) investigated the real 
world data against predictions of GH model, using cross sectional US nontariff barriers and 
considering lobbying due to protection on intermediate inputs as well as the effects of welfare 
and counter-lobbying on contribution schedules. They estimated two specifications, one is the 
sparse specification based on the pure GH model with intermediate goods, and the other is a 
larger specification based on the existing empirical work. The equations for these specifications 
are as follows: (Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000) 
   
   
     
      
 
 
        
 
 
                                             (4-12) 
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Where z is the inverse import penetration ratio, e is the import elasticity, t is level of 
protection, I is an indicator variable that equals 1 if sector i is organized into a lobby.   is the 
fraction of the population organized in to final good lobbies, and   is the intermediate good 
lobby. 
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In equation 4-12, the first equation is based on GH predictions about the rate of 
protection across industries in which level of protection is measured by the overall nontariff 
barrier coverage ratio (NTB). In the second equation, the dependent variable is measured by 
lobbying spending per contributing firm, scaled by value added. Measurement of lobbying 
competition is done by the bargaining strength of downstream users whose interests are in 
contrast with protectionism in upstream producers.  
They used two measures for this end: the share of the upstream lobby’s output that is sold 
downstream as intermediate goods (DOWNSTREAMSHR) and a Herfindal measure of buyer 
concentration among downstream industries for the upstream lobby’s output 
(DOWNSTREAMHERF). With respect to lobbying competition, the strong competition 
hypothesis is the joint hypothesis of                And a weaker hypothesis is any of 
these factors positive. The third equation is the specification of import equation which is based 
on Trefler (1993) work.  
In NTB equation of specification 4-12’, exogenous political economy variables are 
included as control variables, XN which are based on the works of Baldwin (1986), Brock and 
Magee(1978),Caves(1976),Corden(1974),Olsen(1965) and Trefler (1993).These variables are 
corresponding to both special interest theories and public interest ones and are described in table 
4-3. (Gawande and Bandyopadhyay, 2000) 
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Table 4-3: Descriptions of Variables Used In the Econometric Analysis 
Variable  Description 
     U.S all nontariff barriers coverage of imports from partner j,1983 
TAR U.S post-Tokyo round ad-valorem tariffs(Ratio) 
PACFIRM Corporate PAC spending per contributing firm, over 1977-1984.($100Mn) 
PACTRADE Trade-related PACFIRM/VA 
VA Value Added,1983($Bn) 
     U.S import from partner j,1983($Bn) 
     U.S export to partner j,1983($Bn) 
IMP U.S total imports across all partners  
EXP U.S total exports across all partners 
CONS U.S consumption,1983 ($Bn)=VA+IMP-EXP 
    
  Partner j’s NTB coverage of its imports from the U.S ,1983.(ratio) 
UNION Fraction of employees unionized ,1981 
SCIENTISTS Fraction of employees classified as scientists and engineers,1982) 
MANAGERS Fraction of employees classified as managerial ,(1982) 
UNSKILLED Fraction of employees classified as unskileed,1982 
AVGERAN Average earnings per employee,1982($000/year) 
FIRMSCALE Measure of industry scale :Value added per firm,1982.($Bn/firm) 
CONC4 Four-firm concentration ratio,1982 
STATES Number of states in which production is located,1982 
NE82 Number of employees,1982(Mn.persons) 
IMPGROWTH Change in U.S import-consumption ratio between 1979 and 1982. 
 TAR Change in ad valorem tariffs due to Tokyo round cuts 
EARNGROWTH Change in earnings between 1979 and 1982. 
NEGROWTH Growth in employment during 1982 
LABORSHARE Labor intensity=share of payroll in value added, 1982. 
DOWNSTREAMSHR Percentage of an industry’s shipments used as intermediate goods in other. 
DOWNSTREAMHERF Intermediate-goods-output buyer concentration. 
HERF Herfindahl index of firm concentration 
INTERMTAR Average tariff on intermediate goods use in an industry 
INTERMNTB Average NTB coverage of intermediate goods use n an industry. 
ELAST0 Own price elasticity of imports (from Sheills et all(1986)) 
CROSSEL0 Cross price elasticity between home (U.S) and imports. (from Sheills et 
all(1986)) 
ELAST1 ELAST0 corrected for errors-in-variables 
CROSSEL1 CROSSEL0 corrected for errors-in-variables 
Z (CONS/IMP)/10000 
 
 
 [(CONS/IMP)/        ]/10000 
          Dummies for four industry groups: food processing,resource-
intensive,general manufacturing, and capital-intensive  
K/L Capital-labor ratio 
(K/L            K/L      where   g=1,…4 are the four industry group-dummies 
  
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) checked size and sign of coefficients, similar to 
Goldberg and Maggi (1999) study. They also checked if a larger model over fits data or not. The 
larger NTB model has a good explanation power and provides the right signs of variables.  
Results of estimating NTB and lobbying equations of specification 4-12’ are presented in 
table 4-4. The bold numbers are estimates that confirm the G-H predictions and italicized 
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estimates are in contrast with GH model. On NTB equation, the signs of z/e and I z/e 
coefficients are negative and positive, respectively, which are consistent with predictions of GH 
model, and both coefficients are measured precisely. (Gowanda and Bandyopadhyay 2000) 
Table 4-4:2SLS Estimates From Aggregate U.S NTBs: Three equation model [NTB, 
LOBBYING, IMPORT]. Grossman-Helpman specification (parsimonious) 
Model 1 
 NTB Eq LOBBY Eq 
 Coef s.e Coef s.e 
NTB/(1+NTB) DEP - - - 
Ln (PACFIRM/VA) - - DEP - 
z/e -3.088 1.532 - - 
I   z/e 3.145 1.572 - - 
INTERMTAR 0.780 0.242 - - 
INTERMNTB 0.362 0.062 - - 
Ln (HERF) - - 0.177 0.068 
Ln (IMP/CONS) - - 0.298 0.064 
Ln (NTB/(1+NTB) - - -0.069 0.027 
Ln (ELAST1) - - 0.376 0.242 
Ln (DOWNSTREAMSHR) - - 0.321 0.105 
Ln (DOWNSTREAMHERF) - - 0.278 0.091 
constant -0.042 0.017 -2.195 0.348 
N 242 242 
k 5 7 
R2 0.234 0.166 
Model F 18.10 7.82 
AIC -1.369 3.047 
SIC 0.648 -1.574 
Ln L 170.7 -361.7 
  ln (PAC/VA)   ln 
(DWL/VA) 
- 0.634 0.250 
 
This result is in contrast to empirical literature on protection which states that 1/z should 
be positively related to protection. One reason for this contrast is that import elasticity’s were not 
used in empirical literatures, while their inclusion in GH model is a unique feature of the model. 
Also, in traditional literature, role of political organizations was measured by proxy variables 
such as concentration ratios and scales. However in GH model, treating political organizations is 
precise and it is also a unique feature of this model. (Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000) 
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Sum of coefficients z/e and I z/e is also tested to be positive, but it is not statistically 
significant and close to zero. This observation implies that the fraction of population which is 
organized in lobbies is 1. This is not true for large populations, but for the case of study by 
(Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000), the sample covers 242 manufacturing industries, and this 
result can be true. Estimations of INTERMTAR and INTERMNTB variables are positive and 
precise which support the prediction that the rate of protection on intermediates has a positive 
effect on the rate of protection on the final good.  
The other prediction that the lobbying competition with downstream industries leads to increased 
lobbying is also supported. The bigger DOWNSTREAMSHR, the higher the chances of facing 
political opposition, and it needs to pay more to overcome the opposition. The greater 
DOWNSTREAMEHR, their personal stakes is greater in preventing upstream rivals of buying 
protection.  
Results of estimates of large model (specification 4-12’) are presented in table 4-5. GH 
model predictions are supported from the larger model. The main prediction that for unorganized 
industries, protection varies inversely with z/e and positively for organized industries is also 
confirmed. Estimates of INTERMTAR and INTERMNTB coefficients are in accordance with 
GH model prediction of the higher the protection on intermediate goods used, the higher the 
protection afforded the final good. The prediction about lobbying competition is also confirmed 
strongly.  
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Table 4-5: 2 SLS estimates from aggregate U.S NTBs:  three equation model [NTB, 
LOBBYING, IMPORT] large specification (SUBSUMES Grossman-Helpman 
specification) 
Model 2 
 NTB Eq. LOBBY Eq. 
 Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. 
NTB/(1+NTB) DEP - - - 
Ln (PACFIRM/VA) - - DEP - 
z/e -5.427 2.773 - - 
I   z/e 5.709 2.312 - - 
INTERMTAR 0.856 0.341 - - 
INTERMNTB o.342 0.078 - - 
EXP/VA -0.124 0.062 - - 
PACFIRM/VA 0.224 0.186 - - 
FIRMSCALE 1.469 0.572 - - 
CNC4 -0.002 0.054 - - 
NE82 0.395 0.229 - - 
UNION -0.060 0.048 - - 
STATES 0.762 2.085 - - 
IMPGROWTH 0.163 0.101 - - 
 TAR -0.118 0.106 - - 
EARNGROWTH -1.603 8.604 - - 
UNSKILLED -0.332 0.232 - - 
EMPGROWTH 0.045 0.060 - - 
LABORSHARE 0.114 0.097 - - 
SCIENTISTS 0.395 0.269 - - 
MANAGERS -0.129 0.256 - - 
RERMELAST 0.048 0.024 - - 
RERXELAST -0.001 0.014 - - 
CROSSEL1 -0.020 0.009 - - 
          NOTE2 NOTE3 - - 
Ln (HERF) - - 0.232 0.068 
Ln (IMP/CONS) - - 0.324 0.063 
Ln (NTB/(1+NTB) - - 0.129 0.027 
Ln (ELAST1) - - 0.275 0.246 
Ln 
(DOWNSTREAMSHR) 
- - 0.224 0.104 
Ln 
(DOWNSTREAMHERF) 
- - 0.135 0.100 
N 242 242 
k 26 26 
R2 0.346 0.207 
Model F 4.58 6.51 
AIC -1.447 3.009 
SIC 0.537 -1.580 
Ln L 201.1 -354.1 
  ln (PAC/VA)   ln 
(DWL/VA) 
- 0.534 0.250 
               Note2: all four dummies statistically insignificant at 5% 
                  Note 3: all four dummies are negative and statistically significant at 1 % 
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So, US NTB data supported GH model about protection and lobbying pattern and this 
observation was robust across sparse and large model specifications. When comparing pure GH 
model with larger model, it was observed that pure GH model is a better candidate to fit 
empirical data than larger model. This observation is consistent with the result of Maggi 1999 
study.  
4-4- extension of GH model 
 
In the previous parts of this chapter, the link between domestic lobbies and government 
in determining trade policy was reviewed. However, there are other studies that have focused on 
the effect of foreign lobbies in country political processes. The general assumption is that 
interaction of foreign lobbies and domestic government is harmful for home economy. However, 
this is not always true and foreign lobbies may shift trade policies in home country in the 
direction of improving domestic consumer surplus and possibly improving welfare. 
4-4-1- Effect of foreign lobbies on U.S. trade policy 
 
 Gawande, Krishna and Robbins (2007) have investigated foreign lobbies’ effect on U.S. 
trade policy. To account for the role of foreign lobbies, some modifications have been made to 
the GH theoretical framework. Similar to GH model, they assumed an open economy having the 
utility function as below: 
 =                                                                                                                                (4-13) 
In which    is consumption of the numeraire good (good 0), and    is consumption of good 
i=1….,n  . 
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Also, assuming sub-utilities ui are quadratic functions with parameters such that domestic 
demand for the nonnumeraire goods have the linear form of equation 4-14: 
                                                                                                                          (4-14) 
Where    is aggregate consumption of good i.  
Good 0 is produced from labor by Ricardian technology and is freely traded 
internationally in perfect competitive markets. Goods i=1,…,n are produced by constant-return 
technologies with labor and are sold in international segmented oligopolistically competitive 
markets using supply provided by fixed numbers of domestic and international firms, which 
produce at constant costs and compete in the domestic market in Cournot-Nash fashion.  
The interaction of government and lobbies represents domestic and foreign firms 
separately. So that the government objectives function are weighted function of lobbying 
contributions and 3 components of welfare, including producer surplus, consumer surplus and 
profits. The functional form is as equation 4-15: 
     
        
   
              
 
                                                                  (4-15) 
Where    is the sectors with organized domestic lobbies,   
  is lobbying contribution by 
the domestic lobby in i,   is the set of organized foreign lobbies,    
 is foreign contribution,TR is 
tariff revenue and CS is consumer surplus,  π 
  is profit earned by an individual domestic 
producer in sector I,   
  is the number of domestic firm in sector i, a is a constant reflecting the 
government’s preference for welfare relative to domestic campaign contribution and b is a 
constant reflecting the government’s preferences for foreign contributions relative to domestic 
contribution. 
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These domestic and foreign lobbies would like trade policies to be set in a way that 
would suit them the best. Then, trade policy vector chosen would maximize the following 
equation: 
   
   
                
   
             
   
 
                                         ( 4-16) 
Where   
 
 is number of foreign firms in sector i, and   
  is profit earned by an individual 
foreign firm. In which α is the fraction of domestic population which is organized into any lobby, 
the equilibrium trade policy expression is as equation 4-17: 
  
  
  
   
 
   
 
  
   
  
  
  
 
 
    
 
    
 
   
 
  
  
 
 
    
                                                                                (4-17) 
Where    is aggregation production of i in the home economy,   is imports and    is an imports 
elasticity measure. 
For cross-sectional determinants of tariff, this model predicts that sectors with organized 
domestic lobbies get more protection (  
  is positive), sectors with foreign political presence get 
less protection (  
 
 is negative) and sectors with neither domestic nor foreign political presence 
get positive protection due to the assumption of imperfect competitive nature of the product 
market. The equation to be estimated is as equation 4-18 in which an error term    is entered: 
  
    
    
  
  
    
 
    
       
  
  
  
 
 
    
       
   
  
  
    
 
    
                                                      (4-18) 
Which    is the effective ad valorem import tax,    
  
     
 ,           ,           
  .            are predicted to be greater than zero and     is less than zero. 
In order to assign foreign political organization, first the percentile distribution of 
expenditures per unit value added was determined in four percentiles. Then, for any threshold, 
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sector was assigned I*=1 if the sector was in that percentile for all years of sample period. 
Domestic political organization variable I was also assigned on the basis of percentile. It was 
assigned a value of 1 if the mean of domestic PAC spending per thousand dollars of sectoral 
value added was in excess of 0.05 or 0.1. 
Results of estimate of EQUATION 4-18 are presented in table 4-6 where the protection 
measure is the tariff rate. Table 4-7 presents results of estimate with NTB as the protection 
measure. It is seen that β2 and β3 are statistically significant and have the signs predicted by 
model.  β2 is positive which means domestic political presence results in higher trade barriers. β3 
is negative which means that foreign political presence leads to lower tariff. The magnitudes of 
β2 and β3 are close, which implies that government sets an equal weight on a dollar of domestic 
lobbying contribution and a dollar of foreign lobbying contribution. ( Gawande, Krishna and 
Robbins ,2007) 
Table 4-6: Foreign political activity and tariffs (1978-1982) 
   Expenditures 
Parameter 0th percentile 25th percentile 50th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
   -0.007 (0.606) -0.011 (0.940) -0.015 (1.265) -0.015 (1.315) 
   0.259 (4.203) 0.334 (5.373) 0.359 (5.88) 
 
0.347 (5.726) 
   -0.766 (1.305) -0.241 (2.860) -0.29 (3.282) -0.286 (3.329) 
L 161.86 180.237 174.827 180.016 
% Obs with 
  =1 
 
0.52 0.22 0.08 0.04 
% Obs with I=1 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 
AIC -1.28 -1.43 -1.39 -1.43 
SIC 0.62 0.69 0.67 0.69 
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Table 4-7: foreign political activity and NTBs (1978-1982) 
   Expenditures 
Parameter 0th percentile 25th 
percentile 
50 percentile 75th 
percentile 
   -0.012 (0.578) -0.015 (0.748) -0.019 (0.950) -0.019 (0.962) 
   0.308 (2.955) 0.442 (4.151) 0.461 (4.267) 0.443 (4.311) 
   -0.006 (0.061) -0.263 (1.824) -0.301 (2.022) -0.283 (1.945) 
L 31.68 46.215 45.451 49.378 
% OBS with   =1 0.52 0.22 0.08 0.04 
% OBS with I=1 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 
AIC -0.23 -0.35 -0.34 -0.37 
SIC 0.09 0.15 0.15 0.17 
 
Tables 4-8 and 4-9 show results with thresholds for domestic PAC spending per thousand 
dollars of value added set at 0.1. These results are closely in line with the results of tables 4-6 
and 4-7. β1 is seen to be insignificantly different from zero. From definitions of β1 and β2, it is 
suggested that structural parameter a is insignificantly different from zero and that government 
sets trade policies almost completely based on political contributions with little regard for 
welfare. This conclusion is not supported here, using β2 to get a, it ends up being an implausibly 
high value. 
Table 4-8: foreign political activity and tariffs (1978-1982) 
   Expenditures 
Parameter 0th percentile 25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile 
   0.007 (0.576) 0.003 (0.197) -0.004 (0.303) 
 
0.004 (0.341) 
   0.26 (2.689) 0.631 (4.031) 0.665 (4.258) 
 
0.596 (4.532) 
   -0.062 (0.870) -0.511 (3.108) -0.564 (3.383) -0.509 (3.523) 
L 151.61 124.506 118.192 138.408 
% Obs with   =1 
 
0.52 0.22 0.08 0.04 
% Obs with I=1 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 
AIC -1.20 -0.98 -0.93 -1.09 
SIC 0.58 0.47 0.44 0.52 
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Table 4-9: foreign political activity and NTBs (1978-1982) 
   Expenditures 
Parameter 0th percentile 25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile 
   0.008 (0.429) 0.007 (0.379) 0.002 (0.105) 
 
0.00 (0.119) 
   0.186 (1.243) 0.639 (2.736) 0.648 (2.861) 
 
0.579 (2.921) 
   0.08 (0.730) -0.436 (1.778) -0.458 (1.891) -0.396 (1.818) 
L 44.016 25.111 25.937 36.782 
% Obs with   =1 
 
0.52 0.22 0.08 0.04 
% Obs with I=1 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 
AIC -0.33 -0.18 -0.19 -0.27 
SIC 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.11 
 
So, it was seen that tariffs and NTB coverage ratios are strongly and positively related 
with organized import-competing lobbies and negatively with organized foreign lobbies. These 
effects are larger when I and I* are measured at higher percentile requirements which implies 
that after spending exceeds certain amounts, the industry is expected to be politically organized 
for lobbying.  
It was seen by these results that foreign lobbying is not necessarily harmful to home 
economy. In a trade policy context, foreign lobbying can improve welfare, as was seen that 
tariffs and NTBs were both negatively related with foreign lobbying.  
4-4-2- Effect of lobbying competition in trade policy 
 
In addition to foreign lobbying which affects trade policy, competition between lobbies 
should also be taken into account. Since lobbies representing different economic interests tend to 
move trade policies in different directions, the policy outcome would be sensitive to the nature 
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and extent of competition between lobbies. In empirical investigation of interest group theory of 
trade policy determination by Golberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 
(2000), it was shown that government is close to welfare-maximizing in its behavior. So, in order 
to get protection and policy distortions, a high political contribution is necessary. However, in 
real world, policy distortions are being sold very cheaply. Gawande, Krishna and Olarraga 
(2012) empirically studied the political economy of trade policy determination when lobbying 
competition between upstream and downstream producers is present.  The theoretical platform 
for their work is the GH model, with the modification to consider the extent of cross-sectoral use 
of intermediates in production ( the input-output matrix). Gawande-Bandyopodhay (2000) used 
intermediates to study the link between final good tariffs and tariffs on intermediate goods used 
in their production. The result of their study was that a higher tariffs on output of intermediate 
good leads to higher tariffs on its users. However, Gawande, Krishna and Olarraga (2012) study 
tried to model the natural opposition to tariffs on intermediates by users of those intermediates 
through theory of lobbying competition.  
The assumptions they used in the model are quite the same as GH model, with some 
modifications. The utility function is as follows: (Gawande, Krishna and Olarraga 2012) 
            
 
                                                                                                                  (4-19) 
Which    is sonsumprion of the numeraire good (good 0) and    is consumtion of the non-
numeraire goods i=1,…..,n. 
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Nonnumeraire goods in all industries are produced perfectly completely using sector-
specific capital Ki, mobile labor li, and intermediate goods produced in all other industries. For 
non-numeraire goods, the output yi is as follows: 
                
   
   
   
   
   
                                                                                      (4-20) 
Which    the value added produced using sector specific capital and mobile labor,     is 
the amount of good j necessary to produce one unit of good i,     is sector i’s use of good j as an 
intermediate input.because of numeraire good is produce under constant returns to scale using 
only labor so that the wage rate w is fixed. Numeraire good is produced by labor only and the 
wage rate is fixed. 
Sector i’s profit is as equation 4-21: 
                   
 
                                                                                                               (4-21) 
If domestic price is      
       , and p is the n- dimensional domestic price vector. Surplus 
which is derived by consumers on the nonnumeraire goods is given by: 
                  
 
                                                                                                        (4-22)  
There is one more assumption that the fraction of population which is represented by 
organized lobbies is small. The result of this assumption is that owners of specific factors just 
care about the prices of goods that they produce or use as intermediate inputs for their 
production. So sector i lobbies just to increase its profit. The surplus derived to owners of capital 
in sector i is the profit from production as follows,  
                                                                                                                                     (4-23) 
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The objective function of government is given by: 
                                                                                                    (4-24) 
       Where G (p) is the objective function of the government,       is the contribution schedule 
of the ith industry,     is gross social welfare, a is the weight the government attaches to 
social welfare relative to political contribution. 
In this equation, it is assumed that all industries are politically organized. Maximizing the 
joint surplus of government and lobbies and having the equations above, the final theoretical 
prediction of trade protection in the presence of lobbying competition is given by: 
  
    
 
 
 
 
 
       
           
 
                                                                                                         (4-25) 
Where      is the absolute value of the import demand elasticity in sector i.       
 
       
lobbying by downstream users the level of production is lowerthan predicted. 
The term in square brackets shows the lobbying competition between upstream and 
downstream users to increase production profits. Lobbying by downstream users decreases the 
level of protection. This equation predicts that the higher a, the lower tariffs. Using this equation, 
country-specific parameter a is predicted which measures the welfare mindedness of 
governments.  
Introducing an additive error term ui, a is estimated from the equation 4-26: 
  
    
  
  
         
 
   
                                                                                                      (4-26) 
Estimates of parameter βc is obtained by sample averaging of the expression on the left hand 
side, and then, it can be inverted to give a. since there is only one constant on the right-hand side 
of equation, estimates of βc are not subject to any endogeneity bias. 
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A more basic specification which does not take into account the intermediate-use-based 
counter lobbying and in the absence of lobbying competition is given by 
  
    
  
  
  
                                                                                                                     (4-27)  
Which     is the inverse of the parameter a when lobbying competition is not taken in to 
account. 
Parameters β and βc which are country-specific are estimated for 42 countries and the 
implied value of (a) are shown in table 4-10. These estimates are highly significant for all 
countries, however there is a cross-country variation of the estimates. Korea, Japan, Singapore 
and U.S. have low parameter estimates and high estimate of (a), while Bangladesh, Cameroon, 
Mexico, Pakistan, Thailand and Sri Lanka have high parameter estimates and low estimate of a. 
These results are in agreement with welfare mindedness of each government in setting trade 
policy. Estimate of a is lowered when lobbying competition is taken into account. These results 
show that lobbying competition lowers the estimate of welfare mindedness of governments 
significantly, so ignoring lobbying competition may result in incorrect estimate of welfare 
mindedness of government and the wrong conclusion that trade policies are set by a welfare-
maximizing government. (Gawande, Krishna and Olarraga 2012) 
Table 4-10: counter lobbying and endogenous trade policy (countries A-Z) 
No counter lobbying Counter lobbying 
Country     Implied 
a 
Rank    Implied 
a 
Rank N 
Argentina 0.079 (5.17) 12.63 19 0.186 (7.98) 5.37 22 241 
Australia 0.044 (2.35) 22.75 11 0.141 (4.96) 7.08 17 162 
Bangladesh 0.571 (20.68) 1.75 41 0.993 (22.43) 1.01 41 74 
Cameroon 0.317 (10.23) 3.16 38 0.685 (14.15) 1.46 39 59 
Chile 0.089 (6.14) 11.25 21 0.187 (8.46) 5.36 23 270 
China 0.055 (3.59) 18.29 14 0.174 (7.48) 5.76 20 243 
Colombia 0.055 (3.81) 18.12 15 0.134 (6.01) 7.46 15 269 
Costa Rica 0.148 (8.91) 6.77 32 0.256 (9.93) 3.90 30 205 
Denmark 0.052 (3.71) 19.36 13 0.339 (14.05) 2.95 34 291 
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Ecuador 0.184 (10.52) 5.43 34 0.318 (11.46) 3.14 33 184 
Finland 0.042 (1.27) 24.08 10 0.068 (1.36) 14.78 8 53 
France 0.041 (2.18 24.57 9 0.068 (2.40) 14.63 9 162 
Germany 0.034 (2.59) 29.28 7 0.064 (3.20 15.53 7 324 
Greece 0.079 (5.68) 12.69 18 0.109 (5.11) 9.16 11 294 
Guatemala 0.149 (7.40) 6.73 33 0.265 (8.58) 3.78 31 140 
Hungary 0.102 (6.30) 9.80 25 0.195 (7.89) 5.12 25 215 
Indonesia 0.092 (5.98) 10.86 22 0.144 (6.06) 6.94 18 238 
Ireland 0.085 (5.09) 11.75 20 0.123 (4.79) 8.15 13 202 
Italy 0.037 (1.98) 27.11 8 0.058 (2.05) 17.12 6 162 
Japan 0.011 (0.82) 92.47 2 0.023 (1.16) 42.76 2 324 
Kenya 0.205 (7.12) 4.88 35 0.529 (11.87) 1.89 38 68 
Korea 0.027 (1.98) 36.65 4 0.120 (5.72) 8.32 12 297 
Malaysia 0.129 (7.78) 7.73 29 0.235 (9.25) 4.26 28 204 
Mauritius 0.293 (12.83) 3.41 36 0.769 (21.66) 1.30 40 108 
Mexico 0.324 (18.62) 3.08 39 0.492 (18.52) 2.03 36 186 
Netherlands 0.127 (7.85) 7.87 28 0.180 (7.28) 5.55 21 215 
Norway 0.132 (5.66) 1.72 30 0.216 (6.09) 4.62 27 104 
Pakistan 0.581 (17.64) 1.72 42 1.121 (21.88) 0.89 42 52 
Peru 0.101 (4.58) 9.95 24 0.191 (5.65) 5.24 24 117 
Philippines 0.145 (11.36) 6.89 31 0.285 (14.61) 3.50 32 346 
Romania 0.050 (1.88) 20.18 12 0.102 (2.54) 9.80 10 81 
Singapore 0.001 (0.06) 948.68 1 0.001 (0.05) 771.96 1 190 
South Africa 0.097 (6.37) 10.29 23 0.211 (8.99) 4.75 26 243 
Spain 0.030 (2.14) 33.82 5 0.050 (2.37) 20.04 4 297 
Sri Lanka 0.296 (14.21) 3.38 37 0.504 (15.30) 1.99 37 130 
Sweden 0.104 (2.28) 9.60 26 0.153 (2.19) 6.55 19 27 
Taiwan 0.058 (3.34) 17.25 16 0.133 (5.02) 7.51 14 187 
Thailand 0.356 (20.15) 2.81 40 0.457 (16.64) 2.19 35 181 
United 
Kingdom 
0.032 (1.83) 31.69 6 0.058 (2.21) 17.18 5 189 
United States 0.019 (1.13) 54.03 3 0.047 (1.90) 21.10 3 212 
Uruguay 0.126 (7.58) 7.91 27 0.250 (9.78) 4.00 29 203 
Venezuela 0.079 (4.83) 12.70 17 0.138 (5.55) 7.26 16 213 
 
4-5- Conclusion 
 
To conclude, Grossman-Helpman model showed that its predictions are connected to the 
theory. It was examined empirically by Goldberg and Maggie (1999) and this empirical evidence 
supported the model predictions. The big picture of Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) study 
is that U.S. protection pattern is affected by lobbying spending and lobbying competition, and 
therefore, protection is sold. According to their results, the reason why protection is lower in 
U.S. compared to other developed countries is that government gives almost equal weight to 
aggregate welfare and aggregate contributions. However, when taking the role of lobbying 
competition and foreign lobbies into account, it was seen that level of welfare mindedness of 
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government is lower than what is predicted in general GH model and trade policies are sold 
cheaply.  
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Chapter 5-Conclusion 
 
 Political economy of trade policy tries to explain trends and policies in trade and shed 
light on the reasons of protectionist policies. In first generation of empirical studies in trade 
policy determinations, the relevance of several determinants of trade policy was investigated. 
Comparing different models needs a one-to-one determination of variables that represent each 
model, which are usually correlated, and this leads to a lack of detailed justification of a model. 
More specified micro-foundation models were developed to solve this problem. These models 
are divided into two major branches. The first branch is the median voter approach, which 
assumes that government chooses policies based on the majority opinion on the issue. Empirical 
investigation of this model was done. Dhingra (2010) showed that tariff in a large country is a 
sum of median voter and TOT components which the latter is positive and has a positive impact 
on tariff across all large countries. Terms of trade component, on the other hand, has a negative 
impact on tariffs in labor abundant and positive impact in capital abundant countries which is in 
line with median voter model. The other branch represents interest group theories which assume 
trade policies are determined based on the interaction of government and organized lobbies. 
Grossman-Helpman model is the most prominent representative of this branch of literature and it 
was examined empirically by several researches. They observed connection between model and 
real world data, and it was shown that considering lobbying competition and foreign lobbies also 
affect the outcome, and overlooking them can lead to non-real conclusions. 
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